We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneer's revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments including matroid environments, position environments, and the public project environment. The valuation distributions may be arbitrary bounded distributions (in particular, they may be irregular, and may di er for the various bidders), thus resolving a problem left open by previous papers. The analysis uses basic tools, is performed in its entirety in value-space, and simpli es the analysis of previously known results for special cases. Furthermore, the analysis extends to certain single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is known to be intractable, such as knapsack environments.
INTRODUCTION
We start by considering auctions of a single item to n bidders (we later extend our results beyond the single-item auction environment). The value (i.e., maximum willingness to pay) i for the item of each bidder i is distributed according to some unknown (perhaps irregular) distribution F i that is supported on a known bounded interval [0, H ] , and the values of the bidders are drawn independently of each other. An auctioneer is given t = poly(H, n, 1 /ε) random samples from each F i , and aims to design an auction that, with high probability, approximately maximizes her revenue from (future bidders with values drawn from) F 1 × · · · × F n . (I.e., the goal is to PAC learn a revenue-maximizing auction.)
The most natural approach would be to take, for each bidder i, the empirical distributionF i de ned as the uniform distribution over the (multi)set of the t samples from F i , and design an auction that maximizes the empirical revenue, i.e., the revenue fromF 1 ×· · ·×F n . One would hope that the resulting auction would approximately maximize the revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n as well.
Unfortunately, such an approach may be prone to over tting the samples, in which case the empirical-revenue-maximizing auction may perform poorly on F 1 × · · · × F n . Therefore, recent papers have focused on designing auctions that approximately maximize the empirical revenue, in a way that is robust against over tting. 1 These papers combine the delicate understanding of the nature of optimal auctions due to Myerson (1981) with various techniques of converting an auction that is good for variants of the empirical distribution to one that is good for the original distribution, in several special cases: a single buyer with a regular value distribution (Huang et al. 2015) , multiple buyers with regular distributions (Cole and Roughgarden 2014; Devanur et al. 2016 2 ), and multiple buyers with i.i.d. irregular distributions (Roughgarden and Schrijvers 2016) . The general case (i.e., that of non-i.i.d., possibly irregular, distributions) remained an open problem (Morgenstern 2016) , even though it was shown that, information-theoretically, it should be possible (Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015) .
In this paper, we resolve the above-described open problem by showing how to take the auction that is optimal for the empirical sampled distributionF 1 ×· · ·×F n , and e ciently"round" it to integer multiples of ε in a way that ensures that the rounded auction is nearoptimal also for the original distribution F 1 × · · · × F n . The analysis uses basic tools, is performed in its entirety in value-space (rather than quantile-space, or "virtual-value"-space), and also simpli es the analysis of above-described previously known results for special cases. We now give a high-level review of our analysis for the basic case of a single-item auction. In Section 6, we extend our analysis to a variety of single-parameter auction environments including matroid environments, position environments, and the public project environment, as well as to certain single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is known to be intractable, such as knapsack environments.
We start by de ning what we mean by "rounding" an auction. To do so, we view the domain [0, H ] of the possible valuations (values) of each bidder as composed of the disjoint union of the semiopen ε-intervals j · ε, (j + 1) · ε for j = 0, . . . , H /ε.
De nition 1.1 (ε-Coarse Auction; ε-Rounding).
• We call an auction ε-coarse if its outcome, i.e., (item) allocation and payment, is constant within each product of ε-intervals. That is, the outcome of an ε-coarse auction for bids 1 , . . . , n depends only on the indices j 1 , . . . , j n of the ε-intervals to which the bids 1 , . . . , n respectively belong (i.e., j i · ε ≤ i < (j i + 1) · ε for every i).
• We ε-round an auction A to an ε-coarse auction A by choosing for each ε-interval j of each bidder i a xed value i j ∈ j · ε, (j + 1) · ε in that ε-interval, and de ning the allocation rule of the auction A to treat all bids of bidder i in that ε-interval as the auction A treats i j . In other words, A is the unique ε-coarse auction whose allocation on every tuple ( 1 j 1 , . . . , n j n ) of these chosen values is identical to that of A. The payments of A are de ned to be the unique payments that make it incentive compatible, and are thus generally not identical to those of A.
Our notion of rounding auctions allows for many di erent ways of ε-rounding any given auction, depending on the choice of the values i j . One might hope that all of these roundings achieve approximately the same revenue as the original auction, but that is not the case. 3 Our main lemma shows that some ε-rounding of any given auction does achieve approximately the revenue of the nonrounded auction. Moreover, for an auction that is optimal for the product of uniform distributions over nite sets of (sampled) values, nding such an ε-rounding can be done in polynomial time. L 1.2 (S P 3.7 4.3).
(1) For every product distribution F 1 × · · · × F n and auction A, there exists an ε-coarse auction A that is an ε-rounding of A and whose revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n is less than an additive ε smaller than that of A.
(2) There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time pol (H, n, 1 /ε, t), takes as input i) a product distribution
As opposed to existing auction-rounding schemes in the literature (Dughmi et al. 2014; Hart and Nisan 2013) , the rounding in Lemma 1.2 is not "universal" for all distributions (i.e., the rounded auction A does not approximate the revenue of A on all product distributions), but rather needs to be tailored speci cally for F 1 × · · · × F n . 4 Furthermore, as opposed to Devanur et al. (2016) , we round the optimal auction for the empirical distribution, rather than nd the optimal auction for a discretized version of the empirical distribution. Our algorithm considers a randomized rounding, where all values j · ε ≤ i < (j + 1) · ε are rounded to a xed value i j that is itself randomly chosen according to the distribution F i conditioned on being in this ε-interval. We show that the expected revenue of the resulting auction (or more accurately, distribution over auctions) is within less than an additive ε of the revenue of A, and so some deterministic auction within this distribution over auctions loses less than an additive ε in revenue compared to A. When for every i ∈ N it is the case that F i =F i is a uniform distribution over a multiset of t (sampled) values, our algorithm deterministically and e ciently searches for a deterministic auction that loses less than an additive nε, within the above-de ned randomized distribution over possible roundings.
Once we have Lemma 1.2, the algorithm for empirical revenue maximization is simple: Let A be Myerson's optimal auction for the empirically sampled product distributionF 1 × · · · ×F n (which is readily computed from the samples as spelled out in Elkind 2007), and output the ε-rounded approximately optimal auction A produced by the rounding algorithm for A, tailored to lose less than nε revenue onF 1 × · · · ×F n . When the ε-rounding algorithm is applied to Myerson's (ironed-virtual-welfare maximizing) optimal auction A, the resulting ε-coarse auction A turns out to be of the following simple form:
De nition 1.3 ((H, ε)-simple auction). We call an auction (H, ε)-simple if there exists a sequence P of distinct pairs of the form (i, j) where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε , such that the winner is always the rst bidder i in the order P that has i ≥ j · ε, and the winner's payment is always the threshold value required to win. 5
As (H, ε)-simple auctions have a concise polynomial-length description (the sequence P), basic learning-theory intuition implies 4 We show that this is unavoidable by giving an example of a two-bidder auction that is optimal for some product of regular distributions and yet for every ε > 0, every ε -coarse auction must lose Ω(1) (i.e., at least some constant independent of ε ) revenue for some valuation pro le ( 1 , 2 ). This is in contrast to the case of i.i.d. distributions, for which we show in the full paper how to ε -round any auction that is optimal for some F n = F × · · · × F into a single ε -coarse auction that loses less than an additive ε in revenue universally for every pro le of valuations ( 1 , . . . , n ), and thus also for every distribution. This implies a simpli ed proof for the recent result of Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016) for the i.i.d. case, and highlights the di erence between the general case considered here and the i.i.d. case. 5 This may be viewed as an ε -discretized variant of the "leveled auctions" of Morgenstern and , albeit with more freedom in tie breaking; this nite discretization is exactly what allows us to provide an e cient algorithm rather than an information-theoretic result. The way we bound the number of (H, ε )-simple auctions is reminiscent of the way in which Devanur et al. (2016) bound the number of optimal auctions on a nite valuation space. that over tting can be ruled out. Speci cally, we apply an elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017) (see also Devanur et al. 2016) , which shows that the revenue of any xed auction from the product of the empirically sampled distributions well approximates its revenue from the product of the true distributions. We then conclude by taking a union bound over the small number of (H, ε)-simple auctions to obtain our main theorem: T 1.4 (S T 5.7). There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time pol (H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ), takes as input t = pol (H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) random samples from unknown distributions F 1 , . . . , F n supported on [0, H ] and, with probability at least 1−δ , outputs a description of an n-bidder single-item auction that maximizes the revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n up to less than an additive ε. The produced auction is an ( ε n+2 , H )-simple ε n+2 -rounding of the auction that maximizes revenue from the empirical product of the uniform distributions over the samples.
As Myerson's characterization of optimal auctions applies to general single-parameter auction environments, we are able to generalize Theorem 1.4 to a wide variety of computationally tractable single-parameter environments by employing similar, yet somewhat more delicate, analysis. First, our main ingredient, Lemma 1.2(1), readily generalizes to arbitrary single-parameter environments, with the error term multiplied by the expected "number of winners". Nevertheless, it is not possible to generalize Lemma 1.2(2) since the underlying algorithm requires the ability to compute the expected overall revenue of an auction, which may be computationally intractable even for computationally tractable environments. Therefore, we instead take a di erent approach to prove an analogue of Lemma 1.2(2), by applying random sampling and then derandomizing the process using random bits obtained from the order in which (polynomially many) samples are drawn. Finally, while bounding the number of resulting ε-coarse auctions is easy in some environments, a more sophisticated argument based on Cramer's rule is required more generally. 6 Putting all of these together, we derive the following generalization of Theorem 1.4, which also pushes the boundary of the set of environments that previous papers handled even for the special cases of regular or i.i.d. distributions: T 1.5 (S T 6.10 R 6.11). For a class of single-parameter auction environments including computationally tractable deterministic environments (such as matroid environments and the public project environment) and position environments, there exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time pol (H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ), takes as input t = pol (H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) random samples from unknown distributions F 1 , . . . , F n supported on [0, H ] and, with probability at least 1−δ , outputs a description of an n-bidder auction for the given auction environment that maximizes the revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n up to less than an additive ε.
Finally, for single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is known to be intractable, but where e cient approximate revenue maximization up to some multiplicative factor C is possible, we prove, under certain assumptions on this up-to-C maximization algorithm (that are satis ed, e.g., in the case of knapsack environments), a generalization of Theorem 6.10, providing a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that learns from polynomially many samples a tractable auction that with high probability approximates the maximum revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n up to the same multiplicative factor of C, plus less than an additive ε. (See Theorem 6.14.) As with Theorem 1.5, this result also pushes the boundary of the set of environments that previous papers handled even for the special cases of regular or i.i.d. distributions.
Structure
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides de nitions and some background, Section 3 provides the derivation of Lemma 1.2(1), Section 4 provides the derivation of Lemma 1.2(2), and Section 5 provides the remainder of the derivation of Theorem 1.4. In Section 6, we extend the above single-item analysis to more general single-parameter auction environments, and derive Theorem 1.5 and its generalization for single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is intractable. Some examples referenced in this extended abstract are relegated to Appendix A; other examples referenced in this extended abstract, as well as the proofs of some of the results stated throughout this extended abstract, are relegated to the full paper.
MODEL, DEFINITIONS, AND BACKGROUND 2.1 Auctions
The auctions we consider are deterministic direct-revelation dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) and ex-post individually rational (IR) single-item auctions among n bidders numbered N {1, 2, . . . , n}, each having a valuation (value) in [0, H ] for some H ∈ R + that is known to the auctioneer. We denote by r A ( 1 , . . . , n ) the revenue of auction A when the bidders have values 1 , . . . , n , and for every i ∈ N , denote by r A i ( 1 , . . . , n ) the revenue of auction A from bidder i (i.e., the payment of bidder i) when the bidders
. . , n ) the expected revenue of auction A from bidder i, when bidder i has value i and the valuations of all other bidders j are independently drawn from the respective distributions F j , which will be clear from context. The overall revenue of auction A from a product distribution
Rounding
We now make De nition 1.1 from Section 1 precise, and provide some supporting notation.
De nition 2.1 (ε-Interval). Let ε > 0. An ε-interval is a semiopen interval of the form j·ε, (j+1)·ε for some integer j ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε . We say that j is the index of this ε-interval.
De nition 2.2 (ε-Coarse Auction). Let ε > 0. An n-bidder auction A (for valuations in [0, H ]) is said to be ε-coarse, if for every pair of valuations pro les ( 1 , . . . , n ), (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ [0, H ] n such that for every i ∈ N there exists j i such that i , w i ∈ j i ·ε, (j i +1)·ε , the outcome (allocation and payment) of A is the same for ( 1 , . . . , n ) and for (w 1 , . . . , w n ).
We next de ne how auctions can be "rounded" into coarse ones, using a sequence of "rounding actions. "
De nition 2.3 (ε-Rounding). Let A be an n-bidder auction and let ε > 0.
• An ε-rounding action is a triplet (i, j, i j ) where i ∈ N is a bidder, j is an index of an ε-interval, and i j ∈ j ·ε, (j +1)·ε is a value in that ε-interval. Applying the ε-rounding action (i, j, i j ) to the auction A yields an auction A having the following allocation rule: given bids 1 , . . . , n , if i ∈ j · ε, (j + 1) · ε , then change the bid of i to i j (for other bidders, or for the ith bidder if her value is not in this ε-interval, keep the original bid unchanged), and then run the allocation rule of A on the (possibly) updated values. The payment rule of A is not directly taken from A, but is rather what is needed to ensure truthfulness: each winning bidder pays her minimal winning bid (i.e., the in mum of all bids that would have still allowed her to win when the bids of all other bidders are unchanged).
• An ε-rounding rule is a collection of ε-rounding actions (i, j, i j ), one action for each pair of bidder i ∈ N and index j ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε of an ε-interval. Applying an ε-rounding rule to the auction A yields an auction A obtained by applying all ε-rounding actions in the rule, in arbitrary order, to A. I.e., given bids 1 , . . . , n , for every bidder i the bid i is changed to i j where j is the index of the ε-interval that contains the original bid i . Each winning bidder pays her minimal winning bid. Such an auction A is called an ε-rounding of A.
Remark 2.4. Any ε-rounding of any auction is ε-coarse.
Optimal Auctions
Our analysis makes very weak use of Myerson's (1981) characterization of optimal single-item auctions, which we therefore only present to the extent required by our analysis. (We emphasize this weak use of Myerson's characterization of optimal single-item auctions by using the nonstandard term "Myersonian Auction. ") De nition 2.5 (Myersonian Auction, Myerson 1981 ). An n-bidder Myersonian auction (for valuations in [0, H ]) is a tuple (ϕ i ) i ∈N , where for every i ∈ N , ϕ i : [0, H ] → R is a nondecreasing function called the ironed virtual valuation of bidder i. In this auction, there is a winner unless ϕ i ( i ) < 0 for all i ∈ N , and the winner is the bidder with lowest index among those whose bid i maximizes ϕ i ( i ); the winner pays her minimal winning bid. 7 Myerson (1981) proved that for every continuous product distribution, there exists a Myersonian auction that obtains the optimal revenue. Elkind (2007) showed the same for discrete product distributions, giving an e cient algorithm for computing this optimal auction. T 2.6 (M 1981). For every product distribution
OPT (F ), that achieves maximum revenue from F among all possible auctions. Moreover, for every i ∈ N , the ironed virtual valuation ϕ i depends only on F i .
T 2.7 (E 2007). Let t ∈ N.
There exists an algorithm that runs in time poly(t), such that given a discrete distributionF i with support of size at most t, outputs a nondecreasing function ϕ i : suppF i → R (so, ϕ i is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), such that for every productF =F 1 × · · · ×F n of discrete distributions each having support of size at most t, the Myersonian auction (ϕ i ) i ∈N (where ϕ i is the output of the algorithm givenF i ) achieves maximum revenue fromF among all possible auctions.
Remark 2.8. The algorithm of Theorem 2.7 outputs an ironed virtual valuation ϕ i whose domain is suppF i rather than [0, H ]. To be completely formal and avoid any ambiguities with regard to the de nition of, e.g., the minimal winning bid of any bidder (and later on, with regard to the revenue of this auction from distributions with support larger than that ofF ), we emphasize that whenever we consider (ϕ i ) i ∈N as a Myersonian auction, we do so by interpreting each ϕ i as specifying only the "steps/jumps" in the right-continuous step function that constitutes the ironed virtual valuation. That is, we implicitly extend the de nition of each such ϕ i over all of
for every i , where this maximum is de ned to be −∞ (or any su ciently small number) if it is taken over the empty set (i.e., this is the level of the leftmost "plateau" of ϕ i ). In particular, we note that the minimal winning bid of any bidder i in the Myersonian auction de ned in Theorem 2.7 is always in suppF i .
ROUNDING ARBITRARY AUCTIONS
In this section, we derive Lemma 1.2(1) from Section 1. In fact, we prove a stronger result for arbitrary (not necessarily optimal) auctions. Fix an arbitrary auction A, x ε > 0, and x a product distribution over valuation pro les
In this section, we show that there exists an ε-rounding of A whose revenue from F 1 × · · · × F n is less than an additive ε smaller than that of A.
We note that in Example A.1 in Appendix A, we show that the desired ε-rounding A of A has to be constructed speci cally for the target distribution F 1 × · · · × F n , i.e., that in some scenarios, every ε-rounding of A must lose Ω(1) (i.e., at least some constant independent of ε) revenue for some product distribution. We show this by showing that in such scenarios, every ε-rounding of A must lose Ω(1) revenue for some valuation pro le. We show this even for the case where A is restricted to be the optimal auction for some F 1 × · · · × F n , even when F 1 , . . . , F n are regular 8 distributions, even when the "rounded" auction A may be any ε-coarse auction (whether or not an ε-rounding of A), and already for n = 2 bidders. In contrast, in the full paper we show that for the special case in which A is restricted to be the optimal auction for some i.i.d. product distribution F n = F × · · · × F , it is always possible to construct an ε-rounding of A that loses less than an additive ε over any valuation pro le, and thus over any distribution, by simply rounding-down the parameters representing the optimal auction. 9 As shown in the full paper, this implies a simpli ed proof for the recent result of Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016) for the i.i.d. case, and highlights the di erence between the general case considered here and the i.i.d. case.
Our proof strategy for Lemma 1.2(1) is a probabilistic one: Given an auction A and a target distribution F = F 1 × · · · × F n , we will construct a distribution over ε-roundings of A that in expectation approximates the revenue of A from F , and hence deduce that at least one (deterministic) auction in the support of this distribution does not lose much revenue compared to A. We begin by de ning this distribution over auctions, which rounds the bids in each ε-interval to a value that is randomly picked according to the restriction of the target distribution to that ε-interval.
De nition 3.1 (Conditional Distribution on an ε-Interval). For a distribution F ∈ ∆ [0, H ] and an index j of an ε-interval, we denote the conditional distribution of ∼ F restricted to the ε-interval j · ε,
De nition 3.2 (Randomized ε-Rounding). Let ε > 0.
• Let
Note that applying the F i -randomized ε-rounding action to an auction A yields a distribution over deterministic auctions A .
The F -randomized ε-rounding rule is given by the collection of F i -randomized ε-rounding actions for all bidders i and all ε-intervals j.
Note that applying the F -randomized ε-rounding action to an auction A yields a distribution over deterministic ε-coarse auctions A . This A is called the F -randomized ε-rounding of A.
We start by analyzing the impact on the revenue from each bidder following the application of a single F i -randomized ε-rounding action to some given auction. This is done in the following lemma, whose proof, once this lemma is stated, is quite straightforward (but is nonetheless spelled out in the full paper, to which all omitted proofs are relegated).
auction, let ε > 0, and let i ∈ N . Let j be an index of an ε-interval, and A be the result of applying the F i -randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i's interval j to A. Let −i ∈ [0, H ] N \{i } be a pro le of valuations for all bidders other than i.
(1) Let i ∈ N \ {i}.
9 The construction underlying Example A.1 in Appendix A also demonstrates that for non-i.i.d. product distributions, simply rounding-down all bids and applying the allocation rule of the optimal auction to the rounded-down bids (while adapting the payments to ensure truthfulness, of course) may lose Ω(1) in overall revenue. See Remark A.2 in Appendix A for more details. 10 If this conditional distribution is ill de ned, i.e., if
(2) Let w i be the minimal winning bid of i in A when all other bidders bid −i .
it is surely the case that i wins against −i in A if and only if i wins against −i in A. (ii) If F i | j is de ned, then the winning probability of a bid i ∼ F i | j against −i is the same in A and in A (where in the former, the probability is taken over the randomness of both i and A , and in the latter -over the randomness of i ). (iii) Let w i be the minimal winning bid of i in A when all other bidders bid −i (so w i is a random variable). It is surely the case that
Lemma 3.3 implies the following theorem, which we believe to be of independent interest.
n-bidder auction A, and for every ε > 0, it is the case that
where A is the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and where p is the probability that some bidder wins in A when the pro le of bids is distributed according to F . 15
It is useful, though, not to merely consider Theorem 3.4 as a consequence of Lemma 3.3, but to consider "intermediate results" between these two, both for instructive purposes (indeed, the deduction of Theorem 3.4 from Lemma 3.3 involves quite a few summations), but also as these results are of independent value. For example, Theorem 3.4 may be obtained by Lemma 3.3 by rst considering the overall e ect of a single randomized rounding action on the overall expected revenue.
n-bidder auction, let ε > 0, let i ∈ N , and let j be an index of an ε-interval. Then,
where A is the result of applying the F i -randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i's ε-interval j to A, and where p i j is the probability that i both wins and pays a price in j · ε, (j + 1) · ε in A when the pro le of bids is distributed according to F . Lemma 3.5 will also be useful in Section 4. Another way to obtain Theorem 3.4 from Lemma 3.3 is to rst consider the impact of the randomized rounding rule (i.e., all randomized rounding actions together), albeit only on the revenue from a single bidder i and only when her bid is restricted to some ε-interval.
auction, and let ε > 0. Let A be the F -randomized ε-rounding of A. For every i ∈ N and for every index j of an ε-interval such that F i | j is de ned, it is the case that
where p is the probability that i wins in A when bidding i ∼ F i | j , when the remaining bids are distributed according to
Recall that we show in Example A.1 that an ε-coarse, deterministic valuation-by-valuation approximation for A cannot exist for a product of general (even regular) non-i.i.d. distributions. Lemma 3.6 precisely reveals the gap between the approximation developed in this section and this (unattainable) goal: The approximation developed in this section provides a randomized (rather than deterministic) approximation that is amortized over each ε-interval of valuations (rather than attained on each valuation pro le separately). I.e., the di erence between the revenues of A and of its F -randomized ε-rounding from any bidder i, in expectation over
Finally, by Theorem 3.4, at least one deterministic auction in the support of A loses less than an additive p ·ε ≤ ε in (overall) revenue compared to A, as formalized in Proposition 3.7 below, which is a restatement of Lemma 1.2(1).
n and for every auction A, there exists a (deterministic, ε-coarse) ε-rounding A of A whose revenue from F is less than an additive ε smaller than that of A.
P . Let A be the F -randomized ε-rounding of A. By Theorem 3.4, we have that E A Rev A (F ) > Rev A (F ) − ε. Therefore, at least one of the deterministic (ε-coarse, ε-roundings of A) realizations of A has revenue greater than Rev A (F ) − ε.
16 In fact, a slightly stronger statement also holds, where p is replaced with the probability that i wins in A and pays a price that is not an integer multiple of ε when bidding i ∼ F i | j , when the remaining bids are distributed according to F −i . See the proof of Lemma 3.6 for details.
We note that in the full paper, we show that the bound of "less than ε" on the revenue di erence in Lemma 1.2(1)/Proposition 3.7 (and hence also in Theorem 3.4, etc.) cannot be unconditionally tightened any further, even when A may be any ε-coarse auction (whether or not an ε-rounding of A), and already for n = 1 bidder.
EFFICIENTLY ROUNDING MYERSONIAN AUCTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
In the previous section, we have seen that for any target distribution F = F 1 × · · · × F n , the revenue-maximizing auction A can be ε-rounded into an ε-coarse auction A that approximately maximizes the revenue from F . In this section, we derive Lemma 1.2(2) from Section 1, showing how to deterministically and e ciently nd a "good enough" ε-rounding of A when for every i ∈ N , it is the case that F i =F i is a uniform distribution over a multiset of t (sampled) values. (Recall that in such a scenario, the revenue-maximizing auction A can be computed in polynomial time using Theorem 2.7.) First, we note that if A is a Myersonian auction, then any rounding of A is also Myersonian, and its ironed virtual valuations can be e ciently computed from those of A, given the rounding actions.
Remark 4.1. Let A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N be an n-bidder Myersonian auction and let ε > 0.
• Applying an ε-rounding action (i, j, i j ) to A yields the Myersonian auction A obtained by modifying ϕ i to have the constant value ϕ i ( i j ) on the ε-interval j · ε, (j + 1) · ε .
• Applying an ε-rounding rule to A (recall that an ε-rounding rule is a collection of ε-rounding actions (i, j, i j ), one action for each pair of bidder i and index j of an ε-interval) yields the Myersonian auction A obtained by modifying, for each bidder i ∈ N , the function ϕ i to be constant on each ε-interval, having the constant value ϕ i ( i j ) on j · ε, (j + 1) · ε for each j.
• In particular, any ε-rounding of any Myersonian auction is also Myersonian (and ε-coarse).
So, how do we nd a "good enough" rounding of the optimal Myersonian auction A? One option, which would lead to a randomized polynomial-time algorithm for nding a suitable rounding with high probability, is to simply draw a polynomial number of deterministic roundings from the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and pick the one that gives highest approximate (empirical) revenue among all drawn roundings, where the (empirical) revenue from a given rounding can be estimated by drawing a polynomial number of valuation pro les from F and averaging the (empirical) revenue from the given rounding over them. We next show that when for every i ∈ N , it is the case that F i =F i is a uniform distribution over a multiset of t (sampled) values, this process can be derandomized to yield an e cient deterministic algorithm that nds a suitable rounding. 17 We start with the question of deterministically computing the (empirical) revenue Rev A (F ) of a given auction A , whereF = F 1 × · · · ×F n . We note that in full paper, we show that for general (even ε-coarse) auctions A , this is a computationally hard problem, even when for every i it is the case that | suppF i | = 2. (This indeed motivates restricting our attention to Myersonian auctions in this section.) Nonetheless, we now show that for a Myersonian auction A , its empirical revenue may be precisely computed in polynomial time. The key idea behind this result is that the revenue of a Myersonian auction from a given valuation pro le only depends on the two highest ironed virtual bids; therefore, the algorithm e ciently calculates the overall revenue by enumerating over all of the possibilities for these two bids. L 4.2. Let n, t ∈ N. There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(n, t), such that given n discrete distributionŝ F 1 , . . . ,F n , each with support of size at most t, and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing ϕ i : suppF i → R (so, ϕ i is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs the revenue Rev (ϕ i ) i ∈N (F ) of the Myersonian auction (ϕ i ) i ∈N over the product distributionF = F 1 × · · · ×F n .
P
. The algorithm is as follows:
(1) For every i ∈ N , for every j ∈ N \ {i}, and for every
(So L i j ( j ) is the probability that the value j of j precedes the value of i.) (2) Initialize: r ← 0. (3) For every i ∈ N , for every j ∈ N \ {i}, and for every j ∈ suppF j : (a) If i < j, then let w i ∈F i be the lowest such that
(So w i is the lowest value of i that precedes the value j of j. Thus, w i is the payment of i when both i wins and j is the second-highest bidder with bid j .) (c) Update:
(The added amount is the contribution to the expected revenue from valuation pro les where i wins and j is the second-highest bidder with bid j .) (4) Output: r .
We are now ready to present a deterministic algorithm that, given a Myersonian auction A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N that maximizes (empirical) revenue, nds an ε-rounding of A that maximizes (empirical) revenue up to less than an additive nε. This algorithm sequentially and greedily searches for the values i j for ε-rounding A, calculating the interim revenues (following each rounding action) via the algorithm of Lemma 4.2, and bounding the revenue loss via Lemma 3.5. From this algorithm, Lemma 1.2(2) follows. P 4.3. Let n, t ∈ N and let ε > 0. There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n, 1 /ε, t), such that given n discrete distributionsF 1 , . . . ,F n , each with support of size at most t, and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing ϕ i : suppF i → R (so, ϕ i is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs for every i ∈ N a function ϕ i , such that (ϕ i ) i ∈N is an ε-rounding of (ϕ i ) i ∈N , and such that
P . The algorithm is as follows: (1) Initialize: ϕ i ← ϕ i for every i.
(2) For every j ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε : For every i ∈ suppF i ∩ j ·ε, (j +1)·ε ∪{j ·ε}:
(So ϕ is updated by applying the ε-rounding action (i, j, i j ) that yields the highest revenue for ϕ (after updating) among all ε-rounding actions for bidder i's ε-interval j.) (Lemma 3.5 guarantees that the revenue loss is less than ε ·p i j for every pair (i, j), and so less than ε ·p i ≤ ε for every i, where p i is the probability that i wins, for a total of less than nε over all bidders. Note that p i j does not change during our modi cation of ϕ i at any ε-interval with index k j; on the other hand, the probabilities p i may well change during our modi cation of ϕ i for i i, and therefore our bound on the overall revenue loss is nε rather than ε as in the case of randomized rounding studied in Section 3.) (4) Output:
Recall that we have shown in Section 3 that there exists an ε-rounding of any given Myersonian auction for any given target distribution, that loses less than an additive ε in revenue. It is unclear to us whether one can bridge the gap between this (tight) less-than-ε loss and the less-than-nε loss of Proposition 4.3 via an e cient deterministic algorithm.
UNIFORM CONVERGENCE OVER THE SET OF ROUNDED MYERSONIAN AUCTIONS
In this section, we conclude the derivation of Theorem 1.4 from Section 1. While most previous analyses (Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015; Roughgarden and Schrijvers 2016) restricted the set of possible "output auctions" to an in nite set and used advanced statistical tools to obtain that all auctions in this set perform similarly well on the empirical distribution and on the true distribution, in this paper we restrict the set of possible "output auctions" to a nite set, for which such a uniform-convergence result may be shown via an elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017) (see also Devanur et al. 2016) .
De nition 5.1 (S n ε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse Myersonian n-bidder auctions (for valuations in [0, H ]) by S n ε . L 5.2. S n ε ≤ exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) .
P
. 19 Let I 0, . . . , H /ε . We claim that every ε-coarse Myersonian auction A (for valuations in [0, H ]) is completely speci ed by a sequence (i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), . . . , (i K , j K ) of distinct pairs from N × I (so K ≤ |N | · |I |). The correspondence is as follows: Given such a sequence, the allocation rule of the corresponding auction is speci ed by the following algorithm:
(1) If i 1 ≥ j 1 · ε, then i 1 wins; else, continue.
(2) If i 2 ≥ j 2 · ε, then i 2 wins; else, continue. . . .
The winner (if any) pays her minimal winning bid. Indeed, such a sequence may be constructed for any ε-coarse Myersonian auction A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N by taking all pairs (i, j) such that ϕ i attains nonnegative value on the ε-interval with index j, and sorting these pairs in decreasing order of this nonnegative value, breaking ties in favor of lower i, and for the same i in favor of higher j. 20 By Lemma 5.2, we obtain the following corollary of Lemma 1.2(1)/ Proposition 3.7, which may be of independent interest. C 5.3. For every ε > 0, there exists a nite set of auctions S n ε (of size at most exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) ), such that for every product distribution
n there exists an auction A ∈ S n ε that approximates the maximum possible revenue from F up to less than an additive ε.
The exponential size of S n ε means that if we can show for any given single auction that the number of samples required for it to perform similarly well on the empirical distributionF and on the true distribution F is polynomial in H, n, and 1 /ε, but has logarithmic dependence on the desired success probability δ (as in the ChernoHoe ding Inequality), then a union bound over S n ε can show that a polynomial number of samples su ces to guarantee that with high probability all ε-coarse Myersonian auctions perform similarly well on the empirical distributionF and on the true distribution F . Fortunately, an elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017) For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) such that the following holds. Fix F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ ∆([0, H ]) and x an auction A. Draw t samples from each F i , and letF i be the empirical uniform distribution over the t samples from F i . Then, with probability at least 1−δ it is the case that
For completeness, we provide in the full paper a short proof of Proposition 5.4 via the Cherno -Hoe ding Inequality and a union bound.
Remark 5.5. By the Cherno -Hoe ding Inequality, when we draw t tuples ( 1 1 , . . . , 1 n ), · · · , ( t 1 , . . . , t n ) from F , the empirical average value of the revenue of A is concentrated around its expectation Rev A (F ). This is not what Proposition 5.4 (and Babichenko et al. 2017 / Devanur et al. 2016 ) shows, since this shows that 
is close to Rev A (F ).
As noted above, the logarithmic dependence of t on 1 /δ in Proposition 5.4, in conjunction with the exponential size of S n ε , allows us to use the union bound to obtain the required uniform-convergence result over S n ε . L 5.6. For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) such that the following holds. Fix F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ ∆ [0, H ] , draw t samples from each F i , and letF i be the empirical uniform distribution over the t samples from F i . With probability at least 1−δ , it is the case that
Combining Lemma 5.6, Proposition 4.3, and Theorem 2.7, we obtain the following theorem, providing a polynomial-time algorithm for learning an approximately optimal auction from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product distribution.
T 5.7 (D T 1.4). There exists t = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) such that the following holds. Let F 1 , . . . , F n be arbitrary distributions on [0, H ]. For every i ∈ N , draw t samples from F i , and letF i be the empirical distribution over the t samples from F i . Then, with probability at least 1−δ , the optimal auction forF =F 1 × · · · ×F n (which can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7), when ε n+2 -rounded via the deterministic polynomial-time algorithm of Proposition 4.3, approximates the maximum possible revenue from F = F 1 × · · · × F n up to less than an additive ε.
. Let t be as in Lemma 5.6, for S n ε /(n+2)
. By Theorem 2.7 and Proposition 4.3, all that we have to show is that the ε n+2 -rounded auction A ∈ S n ε /(n+2) that maximizes the revenue fromF up to less than an additive n · ε n+2 also maximizes the revenue from F up to less than an additive ε. By Lemma 5.6, by de nition of A , and by Lemma 5.6 again, we have that
as required.
BEYOND SINGLE-ITEM AUCTIONS
In this section, we extend the single-item analysis of the previous sections to more general single-parameter auction environments, deriving Theorem 1.5 from Section 1, as well as its generalization for intractable single-parameter auction environments. Additional important examples of single-parameter environments include matroid environments (see, e.g. Hartline 2016) , where the possible sets of winners correspond to independent sets in some matroid (N , I ) over the ground set N of all bidders:
and the (nonexcludable) public project environment (see, e.g. Hartline 2016) , where the auctioneer chooses whether or not to produce a public project from which all bidders bene t:
All of the above examples are special cases of deterministic environments, in which X ⊆ {0, 1} n , i.e., each bidder either wins a fraction 1 or loses. An important example of a single-parameter environment that is not deterministic is that of position environments (see, e.g., Hartline 2016; see also sponsored search auctions in Roughgarden 2016), where n numbers x (1) ≥ · · · ≥ x (n) ∈ [0, 1] are given, and each possible outcome corresponds to an ordering of the bidders, where the ith bidder in this order wins a fraction x (i) .
Optimal Auctions
We once again make very weak use of Myerson's (1981) characterization of optimal auctions for single-parameter environments, and once again only present this characterization, which generalizes that presented in Section 2, to the extent required by our analysis.
De nition 6.1 (Myersonian Auction for a Single-Parameter Environment, Myerson 1981 ). An n-bidder single-parameter Myersonian auction (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X ) for the single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n (and valuations in [0, H ]) has, for every i ∈ N , a nondecreasing function ϕ i : [0, H ] → R called the ironed virtual valuation of bidder i. In this auction, the chosen outcome is (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X that maximizes the ironed virtual welfare n i=1 x i · ϕ i ( i ), where ties between maximizing outcomes are broken lexicographically; 21 the payments are the unique 22 nonnegative payments that make this auction truthful for all valuation pro les in [0, H ] n .
For arbitrary single-parameter environments, Myerson (1981) proves the following generalization of Theorem 2.6. 1981) . For every single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n and product distribution F = F 1 × · · · × F n , the Myersonian auction OPT (F ; X ) = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X , where for every i ∈ N the ironed virtual valuation ϕ i is as in Theorem 2.6 (and so depends only on F i , and can be e ciently computed for discrete F i as in Theorem 2.7), achieves maximum revenue from F among all possible auctions for X .
The reader may verify that the Myersonian auction (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X single-item coincides with the Myersonian auction (ϕ i ) i ∈N de ned in De nition 2.5.
Rounding Arbitrary Auctions
Analysis similar to that of Section 3 can be used to prove the following generalization of Theorem 3.4.
n , for every n-bidder auction A for a single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n , and for every ε > 0, it is the case that
where A is the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and where
x i ≤ n, where the expectation is over the outcome (x i ) i ∈N ∈ X of A when the pro le of bids is distributed according to F . (E.g., for a deterministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1} n , W A is the expected number of winners in the outcome of A.) 23 By Theorem 6.3, we obtain the following generalization of Proposition 3.7.
n and for every auction A for a single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n , there exists a (deterministic, ε-coarse) ε-rounding A of A whose revenue from F is less than an additive W X · ε smaller than that of A, where
g., for a deterministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1} n , W X is the maximum number of winners in any outcome in X .) 21 Once again, we use lexicographic tie breaking for simplicity. 22 For details, see, e.g., Hartline (2016); Roughgarden (2016) . 23 In fact, as is the case for Theorem 3.4, a slightly stronger statement also holds, where W A is replaced with, roughly speaking, the expectation over the sum of the fractions of the winnings whose threshold prices are not integer multiples of ε . This implies here as well, in a similar sense, that the revenue loss due to ε -rounding is smaller if A already behaves similarly to an ε -coarse auction for a set of valuation pro les that has positive probability.
E ciently Rounding Myersonian Auctions for Empirical Distributions
While the deterministic rounding algorithm of Proposition 4.3 can be adapted to certain single-parameter environments beyond the single-item environment, such as matroid and position environments, its complexity even for these two environments becomes exponential in the maximum number of winners. For this reason, we now consider a di erent approach for e ciently searching for a revenue-approximating deterministic rounding of a given Myersonian auction A, for a given target distribution F . Recall that in Section 4, we sketched the following outline for a simple randomized polynomial-time algorithm for nding, with high probability, a revenue-approximating ε-rounding of A: draw a polynomial number of deterministic roundings from the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and pick the one that gives the highest approximate revenue among all drawn roundings, where the revenue from a given rounding can be estimated by drawing a polynomial number of valuation pro les from F and averaging the revenue from the given rounding over them. The approach that we now present uses precisely this algorithm, however deterministically obtains the necessary randomness from a polynomial number of samples that are drawn from the true distribution of valuations, thus succeeding with high probability over the drawn samples. Since our entire deterministic algorithm from Theorem 5.7/Theorem 1.4 is only guaranteed to succeed with high probability over samples drawn from the true distribution of valuations, therefore utilizing a randomized algorithm to choose a suitable rounding of the empirical revenue-maximizing auction A in the above-described way (deterministically obtaining the necessary randomness from samples drawn from the true distribution) does not qualitatively change the nature of our overall result: a deterministic algorithm that runs in polynomial time and, given polynomially many samples from the true distribution, outputs a (deterministic) auction that approximately maximizes revenue with high probability, where the high probability is over the randomness of the given samples. We start by formalizing the above randomized algorithm, to obtain an analogue of Proposition 4.3, which on one hand generalizes Proposition 4.3 beyond single-item auctions, but on the other hand trades determinism for randomization.
De nition 6.5 (Tractable Single-Parameter Environment). We say that a single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n is tractable if there exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n), such that given the (realized) ironed virtual values ϕ i ( i ) of all bidders, outputs the (lexicographically rst) outcome (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X that maximizes the ironed virtual welfare n i=1
L 6.6. Fix a tractable single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n . Let n, t ∈ N and let ε > 0 and δ > 0. There exists a randomized algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ , t) and uses at most b = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ , log t) random bits, such that given n discrete distributionsF 1 , . . . ,F n , each with support of size at most t, and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing ϕ i : suppF i → R (so, ϕ i is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs for every i ∈ N a function ϕ i : suppF i → R, such that (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X is an ε-rounding of (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X , and such that with probability at least 1−δ it is the case that
While for some (true) distributions F (with very low entropy), it is not possible to extract b = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ , log t) random bits from polynomially many random samples from F , we now show that such distributions can be easily identi ed, and an approximately optimal auction can easily be directly learned for them. We are therefore able to derandomize the algorithm from Lemma 6.6 and obtain the following counterpart for Proposition 4.3 for general tractable single-parameter environments. P 6.7. Fix a tractable single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n . Let n, t ∈ N, let ε > 0 and δ > 0. There exists s = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ , t) ≥ t and a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ , t), such that the following holds. Let F 1 , . . . , F n be arbitrary distributions on [0, H ]. For every i ∈ N , draw s samples from F i , and letF i be the empirical distribution over the rst t of the s samples from F i . The algorithm, given the s samples drawn from F = F 1 × · · · × F n , and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing ϕ i : suppF i → R (so, ϕ i is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs a bit e and for every i ∈ N a function ϕ i , where if e = 1 then (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X is an ε-rounding of (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X , such that with probability at least 1−δ , one of the following holds:
• e = 0 and Rev ((ϕ i ) i ∈N ;MAX X ) (F ) > Rev O PT (F ;X ) (F ) − ε.
Uniform Convergence over the Set of Rounded Myersonian Auctions
Recall that in the single-item environment, we obtained a uniform convergence result by noting that any ε-rounding of an optimal auction can be encoded by essentially only encoding the relative order of all ironed virtual values ϕ i ( i ) for i ∈ N and i ∈ suppF i , and also of 0. While such an encoding su ces for single-parameter environments where the outcome that maximizes ironed virtual welfare can be found via a greedy-by-ironed-virtual-value algorithm that at each step adds the next compatible bidder with maximum nonnegative ironed virtual value ϕ i ( i ) to the set of winners, such as matroid and position environments, this encoding is unsuitable for more general environments. Indeed, already for the public project environment, knowledge of the order of all ironed virtual values ϕ i ( i ) and 0 does not su ce in order to determine for a given valuation pro le ( 1 , . . . , n ) ∈ suppF whether the ironed virtual welfare n i=1 ϕ i ( i ) for the outcome where all bidders win is greater than or less than 0, the ironed virtual welfare for the outcome where no bidder wins. We now show that nonetheless, for any deterministic environment (including the public project environment), if we encode every ε-rounding of a Myersonian auction for this environment using the relative order of the ironed virtual welfares for all possible outcomes and all valuation pro les, then the set of all possible encodings still has size at most exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) , and so the analysis of Section 5 may be used to obtain the required an appropriate uniform convergence result for arbitrary deterministic environments.
De nition 6.8 (S X ε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse Myersonian n-bidder auctions for a given single-parameter
There exists e ≤ exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) s.t. S X ε ≤ e for every single-parameter deterministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1} n .
P
. 24 Let (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X be an ε-coarse Myersonian nbidder auction for X . Let M n · H /ε + 1 . We will show that for every i ∈ N , there exists a function ψ i : [0, H ] → R + that is constant on each ε-interval and only attains values that are signed rational numbers with nominator and denominator both having absolute value at most M!, such that (ψ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X , i.e., these two Myersonian auctions have the same outcome for every valuation pro le. As this implies that S X ε ≤ (2 · M! 2 + 1) M ≤ exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) , the lemma will follow.
For every i ∈ N and j ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε , let ϕ i, j be the value that ϕ i attains on the ε-interval j · ε, (j + 1) · ε . We will de ne the functions ψ 1 , . . . ,ψ n by de ning the corresponding sequence of M values ψ i, j via a set of linear constraints as follows: For every j 1 , . . . , j n ∈ 0, . . . , H /ε and for every two distinct subsets N 1 , N 2 ⊆ N , we add the following constraint:
We note that the set of constraints that we have de ned is satis able. Indeed, setting
where by niteness d > 0, we note that the assignment ψ i, j = ϕ i, j d for all i, j satis es this set of constraints. Since this set of (exponentially many) constraints in M unknowns is satis able, there exists a solution de ned by precisely M of these constraints, where all M constraints are binding (i.e., hold with an equality rather than with an inequality). Let (ψ i, j ) i, j be this solution. By Cramer's Rule, each ψ i, j is the quotient of the determinants of two M × M matrices, where in our case, by construction each of these matrices contains only values in {−1, 0, 1}, and therefore, each such determinant is an integer having absolute value at most M!. We conclude the proof as by construction, for every valuation pro le, the order of the ironed virtual welfares of every two possible deterministic outcomes in {0, 1} n is the same according to both (ϕ i ) i ∈N and (ψ i ) i ∈N , and therefore (ψ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X , as required.
Plugging in Theorem 6.2, Propositions 6.4 and 6.7, and Lemma 6.9 into the analysis of the previous sections, we obtain the following analogue of Theorem 5.7, providing a polynomial-time algorithm 24 This proof uses a technique in the spirit of the one popularly used to count weighted linear threshold circuits. We are not aware of the use of any similar argument in the literature on mechanism design, and hope that this type of argument may nd additional uses in similar contexts in the future.
for learning an approximately optimal auction for a class of singleparameter environments that includes deterministic environments (including matroid environments and the public project environment) and position environments, from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product distribution. T 6.10 (D T 1.5). Let X ⊆ [0, 1] n be a tractable deterministic environment (such as a matroid environment or the public project environment) or a position environment. There exist t ≤ s = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) such that the following holds. Let F 1 , . . . , F n be arbitrary distributions on [0, H ]. For every i ∈ N , draw s samples from F i , and letF i be the empirical distribution over the rst t of the s samples from F i . Then, with probability at least 1−δ , the auction output by the deterministic polynomial-time " ε W X +3 -rounding" algorithm of Proposition 6.7 given the s samples from F = F 1 × · · · × F n and given the optimal auction forF =F 1 × · · · ×F n (which by Theorem 6.2 can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7), approximates the maximum possible revenue from F up to less than an additive ε.
Remark 6.11. Theorem 6.10 also holds, via the same proof, for every tractable single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n such that S X ε ≤ exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) .
Computationally Hard Auction Environments
Up until now, we have assumed that the given single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n is tractable. Nonetheless, for many singleparameter environments, including deterministic environments, this is known not to be the case. We therefore now extend our analysis to such environments. A notable example of an intractable single-parameter environment is that of knapsack environments (Mu'alem and Nisan 2008; see also Roughgarden 2016) , where each bidder i has a nonnegative "size" w i , and a deterministic outcome is possible if the cumulative size of all winners does not exceed some threshold w:
In such environments, to precisely maximize ironed virtual welfare (and therefore revenue), one must solve an instance of the well known KNAPSACK problem, which is known to be NP-complete.
A popular approach in the literature for designing auctions for intractable environments X is to have the designed auction choose an outcome that approximately maximizes the ironed virtual welfare using some e cient constant-factor approximation algorithm APPROX X instead of the intractable precise-maximization algorithm MAX X ; the payments are once again the unique nonnegative payments that ensure (precise) truthfulness 25 for all valuation proles in [0, H ] n . We denote this auction, which by tools developed by Myerson (1981) turns out to approximate the revenue from the optimal auction OPT (F ; X ) = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X up to the same constant multiplicative factor of the approximation algorithm, by (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X . Assume, therefore, that X ⊆ [0, 1] n is an intractable environment and that APPROX X is a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n), such that given the (realized) ironed virtual values ϕ i ( i ) of all bidders, APPROX X outputs an outcome (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X that maximizes the ironed virtual welfare n i=1 x i · ϕ i ( i ) up to some multiplicative factor C > 1. We will explore when our analysis can be applied to yield a polynomial-time algorithm for learning, from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product distribution, a tractable auction that approximates the optimal revenue up to the same multiplicative factor of C, plus less than an additive ε.
We start by noting that the analysis and results of Section 6.2 hold for all auctions, and in particular also auctions of the form A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X . Furthermore, we note that the analysis of Section 6.3 still holds when when replacing every occurrence of MAX X with APPROX X and every occurrence of Rev O PT (F ;X ) (F ) with Rev O PT (F ;X ) (F ) C . P 6.12. Proposition 6.7 still holds when every occurrence of MAX X is replaced with APPROX X , when Rev O PT (F ;X ) (F ) is replaced with
, and when requiring only that APPROX X runs in time poly(H, n) rather than requiring that X is tractable.
Let OPT (F ; X ) = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X be the optimal auction for the empirical distributionF =F 1 × · · · ×F n in the environment X . By assumption, the truthful auction A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X approximates the optimal revenue fromF up to a multiplicative factor of C. By Proposition 6.12, there exists an e cient algorithm that given (ϕ i ) i ∈N andF (and given the ability to draw some additional samples from F , if the algorithm is to be deterministic rather than randomized), outputs an ε-rounding A = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X of A such that
Now, if we had a result analogous to Lemma 5.6, showing that with high probability, for each ε-coarse auctions that uses APPROX X to maximize some ironed virtual welfare as well as for OPT (F ; X ), its revenues on F and onF di er by less than an additive ε, then we would obtain the desired approximation result via a derivation similar to that of Theorem 6.10 (and Theorem 5.7):
While a rst glance may suggest that Lemma 6.9 indeed gives the desired analogue of Lemma 5.6, a closer look shows that more care is required here. Indeed, the fact that, as in the proof of Lemma 6.9, (ψ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; MAX X by no means implies that (ψ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X = (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X , as many approximation algorithms use more information from (ϕ i ) i ∈N beyond merely the order of all possible ironed virtual welfares for all possible valuation pro les and outcomes. For instance, the 2-approximation algorithm for the knapsack environment (Mu'alem and Nisan 2008 ) also considers the order of the quotients
i ∈N , which cannot be inferred from the order of all possible ironed virtual welfares alone. In the speci c case of this 2-approximation algorithm, this is not the end of the road since the set of all possible orders of these quotients is of size at most exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) . More generally, we can obtain our approximation result whenever, for every ε-coarse (ϕ i ) i ∈N , we can encode all of the information that APPROX X uses from (ϕ i ) i ∈N , such that the set of all possible encodings (i.e., the set of distinct ε-coarse auctions that use APPROX X to maximize some ironed virtual welfare) is of size at most exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) . (This is the case, for example, if APPROX X only reads the virtual valuations ϕ i ( i ) up to a precision of some polynomial number of bits.)
De nition 6.13 (S APPROX X ε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse auctions of the form (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X for a given approximation algorithm APPROX X for a given single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1] n by S APPROX X ε . T 6.14 (G T 6.10/T 1.5 I A E ). Let X ⊆ [0, 1] n be a single-parameter environment and let APPROX X be a monotone algorithm that runs in time poly(H, n) and nds an outcome in X that maximizes ironed virtual welfare up to some multiplicative factor C ≥ 1. If S APPROX X ε ≤ exp poly(H, n, 1 /ε) , then there exist t ≤ s = poly(H, n, 1 /ε, log 1 /δ ) such that the following holds. Let F 1 , . . . , F n be arbitrary distributions on [0, H ]. For every i ∈ N , draw s samples from F i , and letF i be the empirical distribution over the rst t of the s samples from F i . Then, with probability at least 1−δ , the auction output by the deterministic polynomial-time " ε W X +3 -rounding" algorithm of Proposition 6.12 given the s samples from F = F 1 × · · · × F n and given (ϕ i ) i ∈N ; APPROX X , for (ϕ i ) i ∈N that can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7 givenF =F 1 × · · · ×F n , approximates the maximum possible revenue from F up to the same multiplicative factor of C, plus less than an additive ε.
We note that Theorem 6.14 is a strict generalization of Theorem 6.10. Indeed, xing C = 1 in Theorem 6.14 yields Theorem 6.10, as a polynomial-time APPROX X that guarantees revenue maximization "up to a multiplicative factor of 1" is precisely a tractable MAX X .
A THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OBLIVIOUS ROUNDING WITH NEGLIGIBLE LOSS
Example A.1. Fix H 2. For every ε > 0, there exists a product of regular distributions F = F 1 × F 2 ∈ ∆ [0, H ] 2 such that for every ε-coarse 2-bidder auction A , there exists a valuation prole ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ [0, H ] 2 such that r A ( 1 , 2 ) < r OPT ( 1 , 2 ) − 1 /13, where OPT = OPT (F ) is the Myersonian auction that maximizes the revenue from F .
Indeed, let ε > 0 and assume without loss of generality that ε < 1 /3 (otherwise, divide ε by some large-enough integer). Let 1 ε denote the largest integer multiple of ε that is not greater than 1. Let F 1 = U [0, 2] and let F 2 ∈ ∆ 1 ε − ε, 1 ε be the continuous distribution with density function f 2 (x) = 2 /ε 2 · x − 1 ε + ε . By Theorem 2.6, OPT = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) for the (ironed) virtual valuations ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 corresponding to F 1 , F 2 , respectively. It is well known for the uniform distribution F 1 that the corresponding (ironed) virtual valuation satis es ϕ 1 ( 1 ) = 2 · 1 − 2 for every 1 ∈ [0, 2]. The crux of this example is that F 2 is de ned so that despite the fact that it is tightly concentrated, the image of the corresponding (ironed) virtual valuation ϕ 2 is −∞, 1 ε . In particular, since ε < 1 /3, there exist 2 , w 2 ∈ 1 ε − ε, 1 ε such that ϕ 2 ( 2 ) = 1 /3 and ϕ 2 (w 2 ) = 2 /3. Note that ϕ 1 ( 1 ) = 1 /2 for 1 = 5 /4, and ϕ 1 (w 1 ) = 1 for w 1 = 3 /2. Therefore r OPT ( 1 , 2 ) = 7 /6 (bidder 1 wins and pays her minimal winning bid of ϕ −1 1 ( 1 /3) = 7 /6) and r OPT (w 1 , w 2 ) = 4 /3 (bidder 1 wins and pays her minimal winning bid ϕ −1 1 ( 2 /3) = 4 /3). Let A be an ε-coarse 2-bidder auction. We will show that the proposition is satis ed for either ( 1 , 2 ) or (w 1 , w 2 ). Assume that r A ( 1 , 2 ) ≥ r OPT ( 1 , 2 ) − 1 /13. Therefore, we have that r A ( 1 , 2 ) > 1. Since 2 , w 2 ∈ 1 ε − ε, 1 ε , we therefore have that r A ( 1 , w 2 ) = r A ( 1 , 2 ) > 1 as well. Therefore, for the valuation pro le ( 1 , w 2 ), the winner is bidder 1 (since bidder 2 never pays more than her value). So, when bidder 2 bids w 2 , the minimal winning bid of bidder 1 is at most 1 = 5 /4, and so bidder 1 does not pay more than 5 /4 if she wins against w 2 . Therefore, r A (w 1 , w 2 ) ≤ 5 /4 = 4 /3 − 1 /12 = = r OPT (w 1 , w 2 ) − 1 /12 < r OPT (w 1 , w 2 ) − 1 /13, as claimed.
Remark A.2. The construction underlying Example A.1 also demonstrates that for small enough ε > 0, there exists a product of regular distribution F = F 1 × F 2 ∈ ∆ [0, H ] 2 such that if A is the auction obtained by simply rounding-down each bid to the nearest integer multiple of ε and applying the allocation rule of OPT = OPT (F ) to the rounded-down bids (while adapting the payments to ensure truthfulness), 26 then Rev A (F ) < Rev OPT (F ) − 1 /8.
Indeed, let ε > 0 and assume that ε < 1 /4. For F = F 1 × F 2 as in Example A.1, the "rounded-down" auction A is such that bidder 1 wins if and only if 1 ≥ 1 ε , where 1 ε is the smallest integer multiple of ε that is not less than 1, and bidder 2 almost surely 27 loses. Therefore, Rev A (F ) = 2− 1 ε 2 · 1 ε < 1 /2 · (1 + ε). We lowerbound the revenue from OPT by considering an auction that sells to bidder 1 if 1 ≥ 3 /2, and otherwise to bidder 2. The revenue from 26 I.e., having each winning bidder pay her minimal winning bid. 27 I.e., with probability 1. this auction is 1 /4 · 3 /2 + 3 /4 · 1 ε − ε > 9 /8 − 3 /2 · ε. Therefore,
Rev
OPT (F ) − Rev A (F ) > 9 /8 − 3 /2 · ε − 1 /2 · (1 + ε) = 5 /8 − 2 · ε > 1 /8, as claimed. 
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